Moving the apparent aircraft position from wingtip to wingtip by electronic means is given the name "electronic jinking." Properly timed, this technique can be employed to exploit the intrinsic instability of a missile at close ranges and cause a substantial miss. Physical evasive maneuvers by the aircraft are not nearly as effective. *This research was carried out in the M.I.T.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Air Force currently places great emphasis on mission oriented design, a concept in which all the functions a system is expected to perform in carrying out its basic mission are considered from the start in the system design.
Instead of optimizing performance for any one task or optimizing specific components, the best overall compromise for the entire sequence of tasks associated with a mission is sought. The new approach integrates functions at the system level, subordinating the component designs and the performance in specific phases of a mission to the overall functional requirements of the mission as a whole. As a practical matter, the design process still attempts to achieve the best possible performance in each individual phase of the mission. These task optimums, however, will inevitably be, to some degree, mutually contradictory, and numerous tradeoffs and compromises will have to be made before a satisfactory mission oriented design is produced.
The implication of the new design philosophy is that the process must start with the requirements imposed by the basic tasks that the system is expected to carry out, not with a hardware concept based largely on the capabilities of current technology. One of the major impediments to more effective use of the USAF approach is the lack of a systematic and rational design methodology.
At this stage of its development, the process is still empirical, utilizing trial and error and numerous design iterations, hence costly and time consuming.
Refinement of the process itself would be a worthwhile objective of research.
Applying this design approach to command and control systems has led us to a consideration of a fundamental issue that arises in all combat, how to inflict damage on the enemy without suffering losses oneself. Specifically, we have addressed the question of the tradeoffs involved in the close air support or interdiction task, where success in destroying enemy assets and the survival of the aircraft carrying out the attack are almost always conflicting objectives. imposed upon the command and control system. This is the so-called "from the bottom up" approach to system design. The alternative, "from the top down,"
starts with an overall concept and, by stages, defines the detailed application of that concept to specific subordinate tasks.
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE MODEL
A set of typical SAM trajectories from Reference 1 is shown in Figure 1 . and a launch weight of about 2200 lbs, is roughly equivalent to the Russian SA-6, which was used so successfully by Egypt in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
Since we are assuming a low altitude approach, utilizing terrain masking where possible, it is also reasonable to postulate that the SAM radars will not be able to detect, acquire, and track our tactical aircraft at maximum ranges.
This implies that the engagement will resemble Case 6 in Figure 1 rather than Case 5. At this relatively short range, we can further assume that both the missile and the aircraft will maneuver approximately in a horizontal plane at constant velocities. Under these conditions, the interception geometry for proportional navigation is shown in Figure 2 (adapted from Reference 2).
The There are two additional dynamic elements in the homing model, the radar seeker, which tracks the target and measures the sightline, and the autopilot, which moves aerodynamic surfaces to produce a lateral acceleration proportional to the rate of change of the sightline angle. Both may be modeled as second order lags with undamped natural frequencies and damping ratios of ( H, PH ) and (cA' PA) respectively. The complete closed loop homing system is shown in Figure 3 .
INTRINSIC MISSILE INSTABILITY AT CLOSE RANGE
One notes immediately that the open loop gain goes to infinity as the range r approaches zero, hence the loop will be unstable for a short period prior to impact. Furthermore, with similar seeker and autopilot characteristics, all homing systems will have the samebehavior at a given time-to-go (T) if
Clearly the parameter a, called the kinematic gain, is the main determinant of the dynamic performance.
Presuming that there is some fixed optimum value for this parameter, then it follows that the navigation constant (k) must vary
Heuristically, one can see that this is sensible, since in a tail chase where the relative velocity (V R ) is low, the navigation constant will be low. Conversely, in a head-on encounter, the high VR will force k to be high, which is desirable. In most missile systems, a lies in the range 3 to 4. Furthermore, the seeker head is generally limited to ±450 travel, hence lo must be less than 450 and is likely to be much less than this in a typical encounter, i.e., (.707 < cos ~o < 1).
Our objective in this analysis is to try to identify functional deficiencies in the SAM performance that the attacking aircraft can exploit to enhance its survivability. In view of the obvious stability problems that the missile design must overcome, the first thought is that the missile's dominant response frequency might be excited by the proper choice of aircraft jinking maneuvers.
The principal parameters to be investigated are the amplitude and timing of the jinking action.
MODEL SIMPLIFICATION
Before proceeding, we will make one more simplifying assumption in the missile model to the effect that the autopilot bandwidth is much greater than the seeker bandwidth and that the autopilot transfer function can, therefore, be removed from the block diagram shown in Figure 4 . The following typical values will be used for the missile; 
With an initial range (r ) of 15 miles, for example, the total encounter time T is 18.7 seconds, so T = time-to-go = 18.7 -t 0 < t < 18.7
It is instructive to look at the root locus plot for the missile, which is shown in Figure 5 . At the start of the engagement, the time-to-go is 18.7 seconds, hence the loop gain at this point is (56/T = 56/18.7 = 3). The damping factor is satisfactory (p = 0.5) and the negative real root dominates the response. However, as the intercept proceeds, T decreases to zero and the loop gain goes to infinity. The negative real root moves far to the left and the complex root locus crosses the imaginary axis at a gain of 64, i.e.,
(56/T = 64), hence (' = 56/64 = 0.875 seconds). Thus, 0.875 seconds before impact, the missile actually becomes unstable, and, just prior to this time, it is underdamped and vulnerable to resonant excitation.
Employing a modified Euler predictor-corrector algorithm with a variable time step (0.01 seconds < At < 0.05 seconds) to solve the third order differential equation governing the encounter, we will now evaluate the relative worth The initial range is 15 miles and the total encounter time is 18.7 seconds.
Quite clearly, a non-maneuvering target has very little chance of surviving an attack by our idealized missile model. With the exception of the second order lag in the seeker head response, the missile model is assumed to execute its proportional nagivation task perfectly. In subsequent encounters, however,
we will also place a 25 g acceleration limit on the missile. Numerous other sources of error such as ground clutter, multipath reflections at low altitude, additional dynamic lags, radome refraction, tracking noise, lobbing structure of the target-image interference pattern, speed loss due to drag, aeroelastic effects, imperfect antenna stabilization, and scintillation noise are neglected (Referece 3). In short, the performance of an actual missile will not be as good as the performance of our simplified model. Hence, if we can develop evasive tactics that are effective against a nearly ideal missile, these same tactics should be highly successful against operational missiles.
ENCOUNTER WITH EVASIVE TURNS PRIOR TO IMPACT
The most obvious evasive tactic is a sharp turn just prior to missile ... A typical encounter (4g turn for one second) is plotted in Figure 9 .
EVALUATION OF ELECTRONIC JINKING
It is clear that abrupt evasive turns are not very effective against the near-perfect missile model assumed in this analysis. Even when the evasive
action is optimally initiated about one second prior to impact, the miss distance is typically less than the dimensions of the aircraft. It the turn commences two seconds or more before impact, the missile has sufficient time to alter course and achieve a hit without exceedings its 25g acceleration limit.
The large missile advantage in speed and lateral acceleration appears to make the aircraft extremely vulnerable, whether it employs evasive maneuvers or not.
To circumvent the instrinsic limitations on aircraft lateral acceleration, one might consider electronic jinking, i.e., moving the apparent aircraft position from wingtip to wingtip by electronic means. Simply retransmitting the missile radar signal fromone wingtip or the other would achieve this effect.
Although the amplitude of the jink would be limited to the maximum dimensions of the aircraft, higher frequencies could be achieved and the timing relative to the impact time could be controlled very precisely.
To investigate the potential value of electronic jinking, a series of simulated encounters were run employing the missile model against a square wave target motion. The amplitude of the square wave was fixed at ±20 feet, but the period and timing relative to the impact time were varied. Typical missile responses in these tests are shown in Figures 10, 11 , and 12.
The conclusion from this study is that properly timed electronic jinking with a reversal period of about one second can be employed to excite the natural frequencies of the missile and cause it to miss the aircraft by substantial distances. In Figure 10 , for example, the missile overshoots the target and is displaced about 75 feet from the aircraft center of gravity at the time of passage. Correct timing of the jinking, however, is essential to achieve a guaranteed miss. To illustrate, a "position" reversal at 6 seconds in Figure 11 In Figure 12 , the reversal period has been increased to 1.5 seconds.
This obviously gives the missile more time to adapt to the apparent jink, and reduces the overshoot and the miss distance.
ADVANTAGES OF ELECTRONIC JINKING
An important advantage of electronic jinking is that it can be carried out without interfering with the pilot's primary fire control task or the actual trajectory of the aircraft. Conventional jinking, on the other hand, requires high aircraft accelerations and adds to the pilot's workload precisely during the period when he is trying to acquire his target and establish a fire control solution. Electronic jinking, of course, would not be effective against small arms fire from the ground, but the principal reason for flying at low altitudes (where such weapons can be used against aircraft) is to avoid surfaceto-air missiles. If electronic jinking proves to be effective against SAM attacks, then aircraft will be able to utilize the higher approach altitudes again where small arms fire is not a great danger. Needless to say, approaching the target at higher altitudes also makes the target acquisition and fire control problem easier.
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